We examine whether bank-related hedge funds benefited from bailout programs initiated in seven countries during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Reduced fund liquidation probabilities followed bailouts of financial firms offering prime brokerage and custodial services to hedge funds in the short term. However, for institutions with minimal participation in bailouts, related hedge fund liquidation probabilities increased. Bailouts did not lead to improved capital levels in bank-related hedge funds. Collectively, our evidence suggests that bailouts helped stem the propagation of contagion through information channels rather than directly through counterparty funding.
During times of financial turmoil, hedge funds' extensive and economically significant ties to banking institutions spur fears of systemic risk among regulators and investors. Considerable resources were expended by governments worldwide on maintaining the economic viability of financial institutions to stave off the effects of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. As reflected in the following headlines from the popular press, some market participants take the view that hedge funds benefit from bailout plans, while others think coverage for hedge funds under such plans is inevitable: Is there substance to the claim that hedge funds are direct beneficiaries of bailing out financial institutions to which they have links? In this paper we answer this question in the context of bailout programs announced in seven countries during the financial crisis period [2007] [2008] [2009] . Hedge funds are of broader concern to our paper than just the populist sentiment, since during financial crises rapidly increasing counterparty risk is one of the most feared potential consequences of the crisis. As such, financial economists, regulators and the investing and taxpaying public are vitally interested in whether the bailouts reduced counterparty risk in the hedge fund industry. Indeed, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke's justification of bank bailouts by the United States government reflects concerns about counterparty risk: "As more firms lost access to funding, the vicious circle of forced selling, increased volatility, and higher haircuts and margin calls that was already well advanced at 1 Josef Ackermann is Deutsche Bank AG's Chief Executive Officer. The hedge fund industry presents an insightful environment in which to examine whether the supposed benefits of bank bailouts extend beyond the targeted institutions and flow into the wider financial market. The basic intuition backing this claim comes from several observations. First, hedge funds, through prime brokerage and other arrangements primarily involving banks, constitute a distinct and significant clientele group with extensive dependence on the financial health of financial institutions. For example, prime brokerage banks provide hedge funds with financing, lend them securities for short-selling purposes, and often combine these services with settlement and custodial facilities.
A.I.G. Bailout May Aid Hedge Funds
Second, during the global financial crisis, hedge fund investors and portfolio managers became increasingly concerned about the creditworthiness of prime brokers and their parent organizations. Third, regulators and financial markets expected that rescue packages would help reduce counterparty risk and, thus, avoid massive asset fire sales in the hedge fund industry that would exacerbate the crisis by adversely affecting hedge funds' creditors. Finally, the crisis period is particularly suited for our study since during times of stress hedge funds' ability to raise and retain capital is severely constrained (Kambhu, Schermann and Stiroh 2007) . While Gupta and Liang (2005) show that 89 percent of funds that liquidated in the 1977-2003 period covered in their study were adequately capitalized, a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence shows during the recent financial crisis, that hedge funds faced major difficulties in their ability to maintain capital funding and to meet redemptions.
3 Empirically, Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013) and Ben-David, Franzoni and 4 Moussawi (2012) show that during times of liquidity crisis, hedge funds dramatically reduce their market exposure, corroborating regulators' concern with the hedge fund induced risk of asset fire sales.
The theoretical link between bailouts and hedge fund contagion is provided by Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) who, based on Brunnermeir and Pedersen's (2009) model of the interaction of asset and funding liquidity, propose that the financial health of prime brokers can be expected to adversely affect the funding liquidity of hedge funds. Our empirical tests build on this framework by investigating hedge fund stability in the immediate aftermath of the bailout of institutions with which the funds share significant financial ties.
What is the mechanism through which bailouts affect contagion in the hedge fund industry? The contagion literature (see Helwege (2009) , and Jorion and Zhang (2009)) identifies two main channels through which resolving financial distress in one financial market sector (banking in our context) can benefit another sector (the hedge fund industry).
First, bailouts can help ameliorate information contagion -i.e., news that a banker to hedge fund companies has been rescued, results in improved operating conditions and market confidence for the bank-related investment managers. In turn, lower redemption requests by investors lead to reduced fund liquidation probabilities and improved capital adequacy in such funds. Second, if bailouts help address counterparty contagion, the rescue of a financial institution leads directly to improved financial health in hedge funds linked to the institution, again as manifested through improved survival probabilities and increased capital. In this case hedge funds linked to weak banks that needed bailing out now have recapitalized counterparties to look to for credit support in the event of a surge in redemption requests, for example.
Despite the extensive links which hedge funds have with financial institutions, there is scant large sample evidence that examines the prevalence of these relationships, much less their economic significance. This lack of knowledge is not surprising, given the limited disclosure requirements placed on hedge funds. In particular, we know little about the details of hedge fund-bank credit and securities lending transactions. To overcome these data limitations, we investigate post-bailout terminations and capital adequacy of hedge funds (rather than trying to identify post bailout financial transactions between banks and hedge funds).
We hypothesize that bank bailouts successfully served the purpose for which they were designed -to facilitate continuity in banking relationships and to secure the stability of the financial system. Accordingly, if hedge funds benefited from having closely affiliated financial institutions bailed out, we should see (1) a reduced number of hedge fund closures and (2) improved hedge fund capital adequacy in the aftermath of the financial rescues. These two measures of hedge fund health have been successfully modeled in the literature (as we outline in the methods section below). The first part of the analysis investigates the determinants of fund terminations in the immediate aftermath of the bailout of financial institutions linked to the hedge funds using difference-in-differences techniques. The dependent variable in the second part of our analysis is the Gupta and Liang (2005) Value Theory. Specifically, the capital adequacy measure is obtained by comparing the equity required to cover hedge fund losses, based on the maximum amount a hedge fund is liable to lose over a specified period with a specified probability, to the actual equity carried by the fund.
Our empirical approach allows us to identify the likely route for the transmission of beneficial effects of bailouts to the hedge fund industry. If bailout monies were used to 6 directly fund hedge funds connected to banks, we should observe reduced hedge fund liquidations accompanied by a positive relationship between the incidence of the financial rescues and the capital of hedge funds related to institutions. We would interpret such a finding as evidence that the likely channel was through reducing the risk of counterparty contagion through the funding channel. Alternatively, finding reduced fund terminations and either no link or a negative relation between bailouts and hedge fund capital would support the information contagion hypothesis.
To address our designated hypotheses, we utilize a large sample of hedge funds whose relationships with financial institutions are identified in the Lipper TASS database. Identities of hedge funds' counterparties are not found in any other hedge fund database, and indeed, to our knowledge, there is no published work that uses such information to date. 4 We match our sample of hedge funds domiciled in 57 countries to 33 financial institutions, mostly banks that were bailed out by the governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 5 In all, our sample consists of approximately 9500 bank-hedge fund relationships.
Our findings can be neatly summarized as follows. We find that, without controlling for the extent of institutions' reliance on bailout monies, hedge funds that are connected to prime broker and custodian banks are less likely to be liquidated. In contrast, funds that are connected to investment adviser banks are more likely to be liquidated. When we concentrate our analysis on strong banks -those accessing bailout funds only once -we find hedge funds connected to prime brokers and investment advisers are more likely to be liquidated while there is no effect on those connected to custodians. While most US banks were able to apply 4 Apart from Aragon and Strahan (2012) referred to above, after commencing this study, we became aware of a recent working paper by Klaus and Rzepkowski (2009) that utilizes the identities contained in the Lipper TASS database to analyse the relationship between prime broker distress and hedge fund performance. Their study also covers part of the crisis period. 5 Luxembourg and the Netherlands also co-financed two bailouts with Belgium and France, but are not considered separately to avoid double counting.
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for TARP funding following the initial disbursement in October 2008, our findings suggest that strong banks' related hedge funds failed at higher rates during the financial crisis.
Finally, we do not find any evidence of bailouts explaining hedge fund's capital adequacy ratio through funds' connection with prime broker, custodian and investment adviser banks that accessed the funding. This result confirms our initial evidence that the effectiveness of bank bailouts was through information channels rather than directly through counterparty funding. While we find that bailouts worked in reducing hedge fund failure risk, the channel through which this outcome was achieved was not the direct application of public monies to shore up hedge funds. Rather, the probable explanation is that bailouts improved the general operating environment of hedge funds, allowing liquidation decisions to be avoided. Relating this explanation to the terminology of the financial contagion literature, our findings suggest that bank bailouts ameliorated information contagion rather than counterparty contagion in the hedge fund industry.
Our paper is related to a number of strands of the literature. There is a substantial body of research on public bailouts of financial institutions. In the theoretical literature, the role of government bailouts in resolving liquidity shortages is defended and criticized by Gorton and Huang (2004) and Diamond and Rajan (2002) , respectively. Gorton and Huang find a role for government bailouts on the basis of the (ex-post bailout) opportunity cost to private providers of capital to distressed institutions. Diamond and Rajan argue that illdesigned bailouts can encourage inertia among firms that are not bailed out, risking a greater probability of total system collapse than would be the case if a few of the weakest constituents had been left to fail instead.
Empirically, Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) The remainder of the paper is crafted as follows. Section 1 explains the primary motivations for investigating the link between bailouts and hedge fund stability. In Section 2 6 Research which investigates the determinants of fund liquidations is also relevant to our study (for example, Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001), Baquero, ter Host and Verbeek (2005) and ter Horst and Verbeek (2007) ), as are papers on hedge fund liquidity risk (e.g. Gupta and Liang (2005) ). A growing literature also focuses on the contribution (or lack thereof) of hedge funds to systemic risk (see Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) , including a summary of the related research).
we describe the data and empirical design. Section 3 presents and discusses the results and Section 4 concludes.
Institutional Background and Motivation
The hedge fund industry is well-suited for addressing the questions raised in our study for several reasons. First, hedge funds critically depend on the financial health of financial institutions ravaged by the financial crisis. In this paper, the specific relations between hedge funds and financial institutions that we are particularly concerned with are prime brokerage, custodial and investment advisory arrangements. (Singh and Aitken (2010) ).
Moreover, in the US, despite explicit protections to banks' hedge fund clients, tracking rehypothecated assets passed on by the original holders of this form of collateral proved difficult for many institutions during the financial crisis.
Given the hedge funds' deep links to financial institutions described above, we have a natural setting to exploit in investigating the efficacy of public bailouts. We are able to address the effects of bailouts on the stability of an important segment of the financial system. Studies in this area typically focus on the corporate sector. As noted by Jorion and Zhang (2009) collect data from hedge fund managers, for the purposes of our study, we collapse the roles into four categories: (1) prime brokers; (2) custodians (comprising the original bank and custodian roles); (3) investment advisors (investment advisor and management firm); and (4) other roles (all the remaining roles). The rationale for our new classification is that we are interested in the first three roles since they represent important financial links between the hedge funds and institutions.
14 We match the bailouts and hedge fund data by hand. First, we identify all cases where bailed-out institutions are linked to hedge funds using company names and verifying close matches through electronic sources such as company websites, news articles and SEC lodgments. We are also interested in subsidiaries of bailed out institutions which makes the matching process more difficult when names are not closely related. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main fund-specific variables, chosen from those described extensively in studies utilizing similar data to ours. It is of interest to assess whether there are noticeable changes in some of the statistics in our sample period given that it incorporates the global financial crisis. A few observations are worthy of note in this regard. First, the mean proportion of funds located in tax havens (Offshore) is 69 percent compared to the 59 percent reported by ter Horst and Verbeek (2007) . Second, incentive fees (mean 12.67 percent), management fees (1.46 percent) and fund size are generally lower than those previously reported although the magnitude of the differences is not large. Third,
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turning to fund categories, 26 percent are Long/Short Equity funds, while each of the other categories represented in our study account for between three and six percent of the sample.
Fourth, on average in 17 percent of the fund sample, portfolio managers have invested their own capital (Personal Capital) and 46 percent of these funds use leverage.
Methods

Modeling Determinants of Hedge Fund Liquidations -Core Design
To explore the effects of bank bailouts on related hedge funds, the basic framework of
our empirical design is to analyze the determinants of our key variables over the chosen sample period (January 2005 to June 2009), with independent variables motivated from the existing literature. Within this basic framework, our main tests rely on difference-indifferences and log-logistic regression techniques, two state of the art methods used in this line of research. Using difference-in-differences estimates, we compare the probability of hedge fund liquidations during the crisis period for a sample of hedge funds whose related banks were bailed out with that of hedge fund clients of banks that were not bailed out. We utilize probit regression estimates of the determinants of fund liquidations.
The majority of the explanatory variables are derived from prior studies such as Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) The application of difference-in-differences techniques within our probit framework is similar to Giannetti and Simonov (2013) . 16 We incorporate time dummy variables denoting the three or six months that follow the critical events of the bailout of hedge fund related banks (our event dummies). To specifically investigate whether bailouts reduced the probability of hedge fund liquidations, we identify the subsample of hedge funds related to bailed out institutions with a dummy variable (Connected Fund) and interact the dummy variable with the event dummy (Post Bailout). The interpretation of a statistically significant coefficient for this interaction term is that liquidation probabilities are indeed different for the subsample of hedge funds related to bailed out institutions as identified by the dummy variable.
We include time fixed effects to control for time-varying market wide changes in the hedge fund industry as well as a dummy variable marking the entire crisis period (commencing August 2007). We also construct a dummy variable for each country involved in our sample of bailouts to control for differences in the structure of bailout packages across various countries. This control is also necessary to account for country specific approaches to managing the financial crisis. For example, at different points in time over the crisis period, some governments announced financial rescue packages such as blanket bank guarantees to run parallel to bailouts. The inclusion of these additional control variables and the post-event window indicators improves the model fit by approximately 30 percent. We cluster standard errors across quarters as well as across hedge funds to correct for cross-sectional dependence in fund liquidations.
Determinants of Hedge Fund Liquidations -Robustness Techniques
Several dimensions of robustness are explored. As a robustness check on our analysis of the determinants of hedge fund liquidations, first we examine hedge fund survival using a log-logistic model following Calomiris and Mason (2003) and Richardson and Troost (2009) .
In this analysis, we concentrate exclusively on how bailouts affected hedge fund terminations during the crisis period. Our sample period for this purpose therefore includes fund liquidations that took place after July 2007. We adopt this cut-off point to ensure that our analysis includes the liquidations which occurred in August 2007, the month marking the commencement of the crisis. The main advantage of using this survival model is that it allows us to examine the same explanatory variables as employed in our probit models (since the model is flexible enough to permit the inclusion of data sampled and aggregated at different points in time and levels). The dependent variable in the log-logistic specification is the natural logarithm of the number days until liquidation, counting post 31 July 2007. 17 The critical response variable is the interaction between the bank-related funds dummy variable and the post-bailout time dummy. For comparative purposes, we present the results of the log-logistic regressions alongside our probit results.
As a second element of robustness, we use a Cox proportional hazards regression approach to analyze the probability of hedge fund survival conditional on the fund being bailout bank related:
( 1) where ℎ ( | −1 ) is the so-called hazard rate, i.e. the probability that fund i exits at time t,
given it survived until time t-1. The vector −1 contains a set of variables hypothesised to influence the probability of survival. 18 We use the same independent variables across three regression approaches for ease of interpretation.
Modeling Hedge Fund Capital Adequacy
In our analysis of the effects of bank bailouts on related hedge funds' capital adequacy, we use OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the capitalization ratio (CAPRATIO) of a fund based on its value at risk (VaR) as proposed by Jorion (2000) and Gupta and Liang (2005) . A fund's capitalization ratio is calculated as follows:
where a fund's required equity ( ) is three times its VaR estimate and the actual equity ( ) is the fund's observed total net assets (TNA). 19 A hedge fund's VaR is measured as follows:
where VaR is the 99% one-month VaR, R 99% is the cutoff return at the 99% confidence level estimated using Extreme Value Theory (EVT), and TNA is the total net assets or equity of a fund. We use monthly return data to estimate an empirical distribution of returns for each hedge fund separately. To interpret the capitalization ratio, a value less than zero indicates that the fund's capital is insufficient to cover its portfolio risk as measured by VaR.
EVT and its application to hedge fund VaR measurement is explained comprehensively in Gupta and Liang (2005) . Briefly summarized, EVT is the theory of modeling and measuring events which occur with very small probability, that is, fitting only the tail of the distribution. This implies its usefulness in risk modeling, as 'extreme' risk events tend to happen with low probability. Two main alternative distributional assumptions are possible in EVT models. First, the generalized extreme value (GEV) describes the limiting behavior of normalized maxima of iid distributed random variables. Second, the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) describes the tail of a distribution above a given high threshold. This approach focuses on the realizations which exceed some specified threshold, the so-called peak over threshold (POT) method and is preferred for its efficient usage of limited data.
Before pursuing the formal analysis, we depict how our dependent variables behave over the crisis period. 
Results
Results of Probit Regressions
Prior to presenting our main findings, in Table 3 In Table 3 incentive fees seem to encourage liquidations which, combined with the positive sign on the variable Underwater, suggests that fund managers who paid themselves higher incentive fees were quicker to shut down, probably due to crisis-induced poor performance.
In Table 4 we extend the base models to our full sample of bank related hedge funds linkages to banks were associated with an increased probability fund closure post-bailout. Table 5 repeats the analysis in Table 4 on a restricted sample of banks that we define as "strong" banks, i.e. those that tapped into bailout funds no more than once. According to this characterization, "weak" institutions include A.I.G., which accessed TARP funding twice, and Bank of America and Citigroup, both extended access three times. In Panels A and C, our probit model findings based on the strong banks sub-sample show that hedge funds with prime brokerage links or investment advisory links to such banks, respectively, were more likely to be liquidated in the immediate aftermath of the bailout. This result suggests that accessing bailout funds more than once signaled financial strength for bank related funds.
However, in Panel B of Table 5 which focuses custodial bailouts in the strong banks sample, no such effect is observed -the relevant interaction term is insignificant across all horizons. model results for the all banks sample, while Table 9 (Table 10) is the counterpart for the strong banks sample.
Results of Log-Logistic and Hazard Regressions
In Tables 7 and 8 , for the all banks analysis, the estimated coefficients from the loglogistic and proportional hazard specifications for the post bailout period are statistically significant, across all horizons. Specifically, for the log-logistic estimation both the prime broker and custodian cases deliver a positive coefficient, whereas the investment advisor interaction term produces a negative coefficient. As expected, in Table 8, the estimated signs   25 are reversed for the counterpart hazard model estimations. Tables 9 and 10 , for the strong banks analysis, produce quite mixed results that defy a clear interpretation.
Collectively, our findings suggest that bailouts reduced the probability of fund liquidations, particularly for prime broker and custodian banks. Our evidence lends support to the idea that improved liquidity in key hedge fund banking partners encouraged survival.
However, we need to consider these findings alongside the analysis of determinants of capital adequacy during the crisis period in order to definitively identify the channel through which bailouts ameliorated contagion in the hedge fund industry.
Bailouts and Hedge Fund Capital
In this section we report findings based on regressions of hedge funds' capital adequacy proxies on a number of fund characteristics. 20 In the model we exclude fund performance which is highly correlated with TNA, a key part of the computation of fund capital adequacy proxies. Also, since the sample for this analysis is only comprised of funds-of-funds, all style classifications used in the empirical analysis to this stage are not part of the current tests.
Our results reported in Table 11 show that post-bailout capital has no relation with hedge funds capital adequacy in any type of relationship, regardless of the horizon. This finding suggests that, likely due to political considerations, banks did not directly channel bailout funds to their hedge fund customers. Moreover, the finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence that US banks that received bailout funds in fact reduced lending.
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20 Since the construction of our dependent variable results in a truncation of the hedge fund illiquidity proxy at an upper limit of zero, we cannot apply Tobit regressions since they apply to cases which involve a nonnegative dependent variable. Taken together with our findings on hedge fund liquidations, these results serve to indirectly confirm the channel of the efficacy of bank bailouts, at least in the context of the hedge fund industry. Specifically, it appears that the effectiveness of bailouts was through fostering the improvement of the industry's operating environment and market confidence in general, and not via a monotonic injection of bailout funds into banks' hedge fund clients.
Relatively little reliance on bailout funds was 'mistaken' for a sign of financial weakness as we find it was accompanied by increased liquidations. Thus, we conclude that bailouts had positive effects in general and stopped the propagation of contagion through the information channel rather than directly via counterparty funding.
Summary and Conclusions
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to provide evidence on the impact of bank bailouts on the hedge fund industry. Hedge funds have close ties to financial institutions which provide prime brokerage, custodial and investment advisory services. For hedge funds these ties result in economically significant exposures to counterparty risk -the risk that if the related financial institutions fail, hedge fund funding would dry up. It is this vital link which we target in our study and we show that in the aftermath of bailouts, the probability of fund liquidation was substantially reduced. Specifically, we find that, without controlling for the extent of institutions' reliance on bailout monies, hedge funds that are connected to prime broker and custodian banks are less likely to be liquidated. In contrast, funds that are connected to investment adviser banks are more likely to be liquidated. When we concentrate our analysis on strong banks -those accessing bailout funds only once -we find hedge funds connected to prime brokers and investment advisers are more likely to be liquidated while there is no effect on those connected to custodians. While most US banks 27 were able to apply for TARP funding following the initial disbursement in October 2008, our findings suggest that strong banks' related hedge funds failed at higher rates during the financial crisis.
Finally, we do not find any evidence of bailouts explaining hedge fund capital adequacy ratios through funds' connection with prime broker, custodian and investment adviser banks that accessed the funding. This result confirms our initial evidence that the effectiveness of bank bailouts was through information channels rather than directly through counterparty funding.
Our findings have two main policy implications. First, bailouts seem to have the very desirable effect of forestalling wholesale fund liquidations with the probable result of slowing down asset fire sales, one of the most feared consequences of the recent global financial crisis. Second, governments will note from these findings that having a relationship with a bailed out institution does not mechanically lead to the transfer of financial rescue funds by banks to hedge fund clients.
With regard to future research, the findings we have presented herein suggest that there is scope in at least two directions. First, is to target the heterogeneity of financial rescue programs to include initiatives such as bank guarantees and the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility to inform the debate on what types of government intervention worked more effectively to reduce the risk of contagion in the hedge fund industry. Second, is to consider in greater detail the process and mechanics by which hedge funds returned to normal business as the crisis dissipated. Hedge funds' intricate links with the banking system are particularly relevant to new research avenues. Table 7 Hedge fund survival post bank bailouts: Log-logistic estimation results -all banks sample -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Underwater -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020** Table 9 Hedge fund survival post bank bailouts: Log-logistic estimation results -strong banks sample 
